District of Columbia

Jury nullification, the capacity of a jury to acquit a defendant even when the evidence seemingly supports a conviction, has historically generated lively debate within American legal circles. While the concept arises in every jurisdiction that employs jury trials, its practice in the District of Columbia presents a particularly illuminating case. Because D.C. is neither a state nor an ordinary municipality, it maintains a distinctive judicial structure shaped by federal oversight, local governance, and a rich history of civic activism. The result is an environment in which jury nullification has occasionally surfaced in high-profile trials, scholarly discussions, and grassroots advocacy, even as official channels continue to discourage open recognition of the practice. This article explores the unique facets of how jury nullification is handled in the District of Columbia, touching on key case law, statutory frameworks, and the prevailing legal ethos surrounding the issue.

The District of Columbia’s Legal Landscape

Unlike states, which have sovereign authority to establish their own criminal codes and state court systems, the District of Columbia occupies a hybrid position. It operates under both federal governance and its own local systems. The D.C. Code governs many local crimes, and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia serves as the trial court for these matters. However, U.S. Attorneys, who normally prosecute federal crimes in other jurisdictions, also prosecute serious local offenses in D.C. This combined federal-local authority can blur the lines when discussing strictly state versus federal law, leading to a distinctive court culture. Despite this uniqueness, the bedrock principles of American jury trials apply: juries deliberate in secret and render verdicts that cannot be appealed or overturned once acquittals are delivered, thus implicitly carrying the power of nullification.

Historical Roots and “United States v. Dougherty”

A pivotal moment in the District’s jurisprudence on jury nullification came with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In that case, a group of antiwar activists had been convicted of breaking into corporate offices as part of a protest against the Vietnam War. During trial, the defendants argued they had a moral imperative to act, implicitly inviting jurors to disregard the law they violated. The D.C. Circuit ruled that while jurors do indeed have the power to nullify, trial judges are not obligated to inform them of this power. In essence, the court affirmed the structural reality of nullification, but explicitly rejected the idea that judges must instruct jurors on their ability to disregard the law.

The Dougherty decision remains influential not just in D.C. but also in broader federal practice, as it encapsulates the mainstream legal stance: nullification is a power that resides in the “black box” of the jury room, rather than a formal right. Many subsequent D.C. cases have cited Dougherty to confirm that neither judges nor defense attorneys can openly call upon jurors to ignore the law. At the same time, Dougherty acknowledges the finality of an acquittal, making it clear that a jury’s not-guilty verdict cannot be undone, even if the outcome stems from moral rather than purely legal reasoning.

Jury Instructions and Courtroom Practices

In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, judges generally follow standardized instructions similar to those used in many state and federal courts. They instruct jurors that they must determine whether the prosecution has proven every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jurors are explicitly told not to let personal biases, sympathy, or prejudice affect their decision, and they are cautioned that the law comes from the judge alone. These directives reinforce the orthodox view that jurors have a duty to apply the law as provided.

If a defense attorney tries to introduce the idea that the jury may set the law aside—especially if the attorney uses the phrase “jury nullification”—the prosecutor is almost certain to object, and the judge will typically sustain that objection. At times, judges may issue curative instructions telling jurors to disregard any suggestion that they can choose whether or not to obey the law. Attorneys who persist in advocating nullification risk not only alienating the judge but also potentially triggering a mistrial.

Nevertheless, the secrecy of the jury deliberation room means that even in the District of Columbia, jurors retain full freedom to acquit for reasons wholly unrelated to the facts or applicable statute. D.C. courts, in step with United States v. Dougherty and other precedents, maintain a careful line between acknowledging that nullification is theoretically possible and prohibiting any explicit invitation to exercise it.

Grassroots Advocacy and Public Debate

Given the District’s history as a center of political activism, it is unsurprising that grassroots efforts occasionally arise to inform the public about jury nullification. Organizations have distributed pamphlets near D.C. courthouses, explaining that jurors have the “right to judge both law and fact.” Such efforts typically echo arguments that nullification serves as a check on unjust laws or draconian punishments. While distributing educational materials is usually not illegal per se, authorities can interpret it as potential jury tampering if pamphleteers specifically target individuals summoned for jury duty. This tension has led, at times, to friction between free speech advocates and the courts.

Beyond pamphleteering, local scholars and media have weighed in on the issue. Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor and later a Georgetown Law professor, famously wrote about the advisability of nullification in nonviolent drug cases—particularly when applied to minority defendants disproportionately affected by harsh drug laws. Though Butler’s stance is controversial, it generated robust public discussion in and around D.C., highlighting again how the District’s unique status fosters ongoing debates about how laws should be applied and enforced.

High-Profile Cases and D.C. Dynamics

Over the years, the District of Columbia has hosted several trials that captured national attention—ranging from government corruption cases to politically charged protests. In some, speculations about possible jury nullification have circulated, especially when public sentiment diverges sharply from the statute or penalty at stake. While verifiable instances of nullification are notoriously difficult to confirm, anecdotal evidence suggests that on rare occasions, D.C. jurors have acquitted defendants under circumstances that puzzle legal observers. Were they unconvinced by the prosecution’s evidence, or did they nullify out of sympathy or moral disagreement with the law? The confidentiality of jury deliberations keeps those answers concealed.

Additionally, because the District’s population includes a large percentage of residents who have firsthand experience with local criminal laws and enforcement disparities, it is plausible that certain D.C. jurors might quietly exercise nullification when they perceive an injustice. Such acts are neither openly sanctioned nor easily documented. Yet, local attorneys acknowledge it as a possibility, particularly in cases involving low-level, nonviolent offenses where sympathy for defendants runs high.

Comparisons to Other Jurisdictions

The District of Columbia’s stance on jury nullification parallels that of federal courts and most states that have addressed the matter. Consistent with Dougherty and subsequent rulings, courts in D.C. do not allow explicit instructions on nullification, nor do they permit attorneys to actively argue that the jury should ignore the law. That said, the District’s unique political status makes any potential push for formal recognition of nullification particularly complicated. If, for instance, local leaders or activists attempted to pass legislation or guidelines permitting jurors to consider the fairness of a law, Congress might intervene, given its constitutional power to overturn local D.C. laws.

In many respects, the District of Columbia sits at the crossroads of federal authority and localized autonomy, limiting the scope for radical departures from established legal doctrine. While some states have seen legislative proposals that inch toward acknowledging or clarifying jurors’ discretion, D.C. must navigate the additional hurdle of federal oversight in such matters.