Jury nullification, whereby a jury chooses to acquit a defendant despite evidence that meets the statutory criteria for a conviction, has long been a quietly debated topic within the American legal framework. In Wisconsin, as in other states, judges and prosecutors maintain that jurors must apply the law as written, leaving no official latitude for ignoring a statute that they personally find unwise or unjust. Yet, the design of the jury trial—a not-guilty verdict beyond the reach of appeal—ensures that a latent opportunity for nullification continues to exist. This article examines how Wisconsin’s historical context, constitutional provisions, statutes, and case law interact to shape the state’s practical stance on jury nullification, highlighting both the official insistence on strict legal adherence and the subtle reality that jurors can sometimes act on conscience.
Wisconsin’s legal history traces back to its days as part of the Northwest Territory before joining the Union in 1848. In the frontier era, small, insular communities often relied on a personalized sense of justice. Although the term “jury nullification” was not commonly used, these early local juries occasionally refused to convict neighbors when they believed the law was applied too harshly or did not align with communal values. As Wisconsin developed more formal judicial institutions, it increasingly resembled other states in emphasizing uniform enforcement of the law. Still, the core structure of the criminal trial—where an acquittal cannot be overturned—left room for moral or communal verdicts if jurors felt compelled by conscience to forgo a strict application of statutes.
The Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, echoing the principle that citizens hold significant authority over questions of guilt or innocence. However, it offers no explicit statement about the capacity to nullify. Instead, its provisions, alongside the Wisconsin Statutes, presume that jurors will follow the law as interpreted by the courts. These statutes define the elements of crimes, set sentencing ranges, and detail procedural rules. Nowhere is there mention of a “right” to disregard an enacted statute if the jury deems it misguided. Officially, moral or policy disagreements belong to the legislative or appellate sphere.
In a Wisconsin criminal trial, the judge reads standardized jury instructions (often drawn from the Wisconsin Jury Instructions – Criminal), which outline how to assess witness credibility, the burden of proof, and the legal definitions relevant to the charge. These instructions unambiguously state that jurors must decide whether the prosecution has proven each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, not whether the law itself is correct or fair. If a defense attorney were to explicitly argue that jurors can ignore the law, the prosecutor would promptly object. Judges almost always sustain such objections, clarifying that the jury’s duty is to follow the legal framework as presented.
That said, defense counsel may employ subtle language that triggers a moral or emotional response from jurors without explicitly calling for nullification. By focusing on the harsh outcomes of a conviction, potential prosecutorial overreach, or the human story of the defendant, they may lead some jurors to question whether applying the law in a particular case genuinely serves justice. Such impulses can culminate in an acquittal that effectively nullifies the law, even though no one in the courtroom identifies it as such.
Wisconsin’s appellate courts, including the Wisconsin Supreme Court, follow the mainstream American legal position that openly informing jurors about jury nullification is improper. Citing precedents at both the federal and state level, courts maintain that allowing nullification arguments would weaken the rule of law, leading to unpredictable and possibly biased outcomes. Consequently, judges are not required to instruct jurors on any alleged power to disregard statutory mandates.
Despite this, case law reaffirms the irreversibility of an acquittal. Both the U.S. Constitution and Wisconsin’s constitutional protections against double jeopardy mean that once a jury finds a defendant “not guilty,” the matter is concluded, even if there is reason to believe the jury’s rationale extended beyond straightforward legal analysis. This stance underscores the tension: no recognized “right” to nullify, but no means to challenge an acquittal that might have been driven by moral disagreement with the law.
Wisconsin’s demographic and cultural landscape spans bustling urban centers like Milwaukee and Madison, as well as smaller agricultural towns and northern communities near the Great Lakes. Different communities may harbor divergent views on issues such as drug offenses, firearms regulations, or conservation laws that affect hunting and land use. Though courts instruct jurors to set personal bias aside, local attitudes sometimes seep into the deliberation process, especially when a particular prosecution is seen as contrary to local sensibilities.
When surprising acquittals occur in cases involving hot-button statutes—for instance, mandatory minimum drug sentences or contentious self-defense laws—the public occasionally speculates whether the jury might have “nullified.” Because the deliberation room remains confidential, such guesses are not usually confirmed. Jurors commonly cite “insufficient evidence” or “lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt” instead of admitting any refusal to apply the law.
In Wisconsin, as in other states, defense lawyers who suspect a jury may be sympathetic based on personal or community values usually adopt an indirect approach. They emphasize mitigating circumstances and highlight potential injustice or disproportionality inherent in a conviction. These appeals can lead jurors to question the wisdom of convicting a defendant—even if the evidence, strictly interpreted, supports guilt. The attorneys thereby open a window to a moral or empathetic acquittal without crossing the line into explicit calls for nullification.
Outside of formal court proceedings, grassroots campaigns sporadically circulate materials on the concept of a “fully informed jury,” urging citizens to consider moral judgments alongside legal ones. While not especially large or influential in Wisconsin, these efforts reflect a persistent curiosity among some members of the public regarding whether juries should have the recognized power to reject laws that they find objectionable. Official responses from judges or prosecutors typically frame such advocacy as a potential challenge to impartial justice, cautioning that informing jurors about nullification might be seen as jury tampering.
Throughout Wisconsin’s legal history, a few notable or controversial cases have stirred discussions around whether the jury might nullify. Sometimes these cases involve self-defense claims, property rights disputes, or drug possession with seemingly harsh consequences. After a surprising acquittal, local media may speculate that the jury found the law itself to be excessive. Yet, jurors seldom describe their decision in these terms, usually citing their inability to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Such discussions underscore that even if explicit recognition of nullification is absent, moral or cultural factors may play a role in how some jurors ultimately vote. Nonetheless, the courts consistently reassert that these extralegal considerations should not override the statutory instructions.
Wisconsin’s approach to jury nullification appears solidified within the larger American tradition. There is no active movement within the state legislature or judiciary to endorse nullification formally. Instead, courts continue to emphasize that adherence to the law is paramount, instructing jurors to confine themselves to factual questions. Potential reforms to sentencing laws, diversion programs, or prosecutorial practices might reduce the scenarios where a jury feels morally compelled to acquit against the evidence. Still, as long as an acquittal stands beyond legal challenge, the path for moral or communal override remains open, even if rarely utilized or admitted.
In Wisconsin, as with most states, jury nullification persists in a concealed capacity: it is implicitly possible yet officially discouraged. Judges, prosecutors, and appellate courts all affirm that jurors must apply the law as it exists, forbidding direct appeals for them to ignore statutes. However, a “not guilty” verdict cannot be undone, so jurors who quietly reject a law or its punishment can effectively nullify if they all agree to acquit.
From its frontier days through its modern legal framework, the tension between legal uniformity and the moral conscience of everyday citizens remains. Although the state’s statutes and judicial instructions disapprove of ignoring the law, the sovereignty of a unanimous jury verdict ensures that nullification endures as a silent but formidable aspect of the criminal trial. As Wisconsin continues to refine its justice system, this duality—formal condemnation alongside structural allowance—will likely persist, reflecting the deeper American debate on whether moral or philosophical disagreement with a law should ever override statutory prescriptions in the jury room.
Jury Nullification is an American Tradition
The Case of Dr. Jack KevorkianThe Trial That Sparked Free Speech
John Peter Zenger and Jury NullificationThe Fight for Religious Freedomto Silence Jury Nullification AwarenessTheir Role in Curtailing NullificationEthical Restrictions on Nullification Argumentsthe Suppression of Jury DiscretionThe Role of Plea Bargains in Bypassing Jury Nullification
Gag Orders and Judicial ContemptThe Influence on Jury AutonomyThe Obstacles They FaceInternational Perspectives on Jury PowersBreaking the Chains of Injustice
Jury Nullification and the Fugitive Slave ActJury Nullification and Prohibition’s Legal RebellionJury Nullification in the Vietnam War EraJury Nullification in Marijuana CasesThe Laura Kriho Contempt CaseAll-White Juries and Civil Rights-Era AcquittalsThe Verdict Hear 'Round the World
Jury Nullification in the O.J. Simpson Trial