Jury nullification, the capacity of a jury to acquit a defendant irrespective of evidence establishing legal guilt, has historically been both a tool of local community conscience and a thorn in the side of judicial uniformity. In South Carolina, as in many other jurisdictions, the courts firmly instruct jurors to apply the law as provided, rejecting any official sanction for conscience-based departures. Yet the fact remains that no acquittal can be appealed once it is delivered. This tension—between a rhetorical insistence on adhering to statutes and the unassailable power of a jury to say “not guilty”—has shaped how South Carolina’s judicial system addresses, or bypasses, the subject of jury nullification. This article explores the state’s constitutional and legal frameworks, historical context, judicial instructions, local attitudes, and notable case scenarios that illustrate how South Carolina manages the possibility of jurors overriding the law in practice.
South Carolina’s legal traditions reach back to its colonial roots, when English common law set the stage for governance in the southern colonies. In the 18th century, local jurors, composed of settlers and landowners, sometimes acquitted neighbors accused of infractions they deemed either unfairly prosecuted or unworthy of severe penalties. Although the modern phrase “jury nullification” was not in circulation, its effect was evident when jurors refused to convict despite apparent legal guilt. As South Carolina progressed to statehood and expanded its judicial structures, the official standpoint grew more standardized, aligning with broader American norms: jurors must follow the law as interpreted by the court, delivering verdicts based strictly on evidence. Yet, the implicit power to acquit for moral or community-based reasons survived, protected by the irreversible nature of not-guilty verdicts.
The South Carolina Constitution, like most state constitutions, guarantees the right to a trial by jury for those accused of crimes. However, the document does not refer to nullification or authorize jurors to ignore a law they deem unjust. Instead, the prevailing assumption is that jurors will determine guilt or innocence according to legal parameters. The South Carolina Code of Laws similarly outlines offenses, sentencing guidelines, and courtroom procedures, presupposing that once a statute has been enacted by the legislature and sustained by appellate rulings, it is to be applied uniformly in criminal proceedings.
These statutes make no provision for jurors to question the moral validity of a law. Instead, the legislative posture—common in most American states—treats the jury’s function as fact-finding within a legal framework. That said, the structural design of jury trials in South Carolina does not allow for appellate review of an acquittal. Once pronounced, a “not guilty” verdict stands, irrespective of whether jurors may have decided on a basis that extends beyond the letter of the law.
Before deliberations, judges in South Carolina routinely deliver standardized jury instructions that detail the elements of each offense, define terms such as “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and reinforce that jurors must follow the law as explained. If the defense attorney ventures too close to advocating nullification—by, for instance, declaring that the law in question is unjust—the prosecution will typically object, and the judge is highly likely to sustain that objection. Repeated attempts might prompt a warning or mistrial.
Attorneys aware of these constraints may opt to subtly appeal to jurors’ sense of fairness. They might highlight the gravity or harshness of a potential sentence, hinting that a conviction would be disproportionate or at odds with communal standards. By doing so, they avoid explicitly telling jurors to nullify, yet encourage a moral or sympathetic perspective that can lead a jury to acquit despite seemingly conclusive evidence.
South Carolina’s appellate courts, including the state Supreme Court, have consistently echoed the national position disfavoring open references to nullification. They have not endorsed any trial court instructions that would allow jurors to disregard the law. Rather, case law highlights that when an attorney crosses the line by explicitly inviting the jury to act against a statute, the court may issue corrective instructions or, in extreme scenarios, declare a mistrial. The rationale is that acknowledging a jury’s prerogative to nullify undermines the principle of consistent application of the law.
Nevertheless, these same courts also endorse the principle that once a jury delivers an acquittal, there is no legal mechanism for the prosecution to appeal or to challenge the verdict. Consequently, the structural existence of nullification is tacitly recognized, though the judicial system avoids calling it by name or endorsing it as a legitimate defense strategy.
From the coastal cities like Charleston to inland rural areas, South Carolina contains diverse cultural attitudes toward law enforcement, sentencing policy, and the moral weight of certain crimes. In more rural, close-knit communities, some jurors may empathize with defendants they see as having been overcharged. In urban centers, various social justice concerns or reservations about policing might sway jurors to adopt a more lenient view of guilt. While no court instructs jurors to apply personal or communal moral judgments, local sentiment can subtly weave its way into deliberations. If the law or its enforcement is considered out of step with local mores, a subset of jurors might quietly nullify, under the nominal rationale of “reasonable doubt.”
Such covert influences become especially visible in high-profile cases or controversies around particular statutes—for example, cases involving self-defense, drug possession, or alleged excessive use of force by law enforcement. When unusual acquittals arise, local media and commentators sometimes speculate that a jury “nullified.” Yet, jury deliberations remain confidential, and jurors rarely state that they acquitted because they rejected the law itself.
Defense attorneys in South Carolina rarely risk direct calls for nullification, given the near certainty of judicial objections. Instead, they frame their arguments around fair applications of the law, potential extenuating circumstances, or the defendant’s background, encouraging jurors to see a conviction as unwarranted or unduly harsh. While these arguments are framed as matters of evidence and prosecutorial burden, they can lead sympathetic jurors toward a moral acquittal—even if it contravenes statutory definitions of guilt.
Occasionally, grassroots groups or civic activists distribute pamphlets or publish content online about the concept of a “fully informed jury,” proposing that jurors have not only the power but the duty to assess the law’s justice. Court officials are typically uncomfortable with these efforts, viewing them as potentially undermining the neutrality of the jury pool. As a result, the broader public in South Carolina receives relatively little formal education about nullification, and the subject remains largely out of the spotlight.
Over time, a handful of notable or controversial criminal cases in South Carolina have led the public to wonder whether a jury rejected the law on moral grounds. However, no definitive instances exist where jurors publicly admitted to nullification. Most discussions revolve around speculation following an unexpected acquittal, particularly if the statute in question draws debate or if the defendant evokes significant public sympathy. The secrecy of deliberations keeps any actual instance of nullification hidden behind claims of “insufficient evidence.”
Looking ahead, South Carolina’s approach to jury nullification seems unlikely to shift significantly. Courts remain committed to instructing jurors that the law must be followed as given, while the principle of final acquittals remains firmly in place. Legislative changes, such as adjustments to sentencing guidelines or new avenues for diversion, may reduce scenarios in which jurors feel compelled to nullify. Conversely, if certain laws are viewed as overly punitive or misaligned with community values, the quiet potential for nullification persists.
In South Carolina, jury nullification resides in a paradox: formally rejected in both judicial instructions and appellate rulings, yet intrinsically possible due to the unappealable nature of an acquittal. Judges emphasize that jurors must adhere to statutes, and overt calls for nullification risk reprimand. But once jurors say “not guilty,” neither the prosecution nor the courts can overturn the verdict, leaving open the chance that some acquittals rest on moral disagreement with the law.
This delicate balance reflects the broader American pattern—where respect for the rule of law coexists with the safeguarding of community conscience in criminal adjudication. As in many states, South Carolina’s official stance denies any rightful place for nullification, yet acknowledges that jury verdicts are final. The result is a system that publicly discourages defiance of statutes but privately recognizes the power of an ordinary group of citizens to forgo strict legal enforcement in favor of their collective sense of justice.
Jury Nullification is an American Tradition
The Case of Dr. Jack KevorkianThe Trial That Sparked Free Speech
John Peter Zenger and Jury NullificationThe Fight for Religious Freedomto Silence Jury Nullification AwarenessTheir Role in Curtailing NullificationEthical Restrictions on Nullification Argumentsthe Suppression of Jury DiscretionThe Role of Plea Bargains in Bypassing Jury Nullification
Gag Orders and Judicial ContemptThe Influence on Jury AutonomyThe Obstacles They FaceInternational Perspectives on Jury PowersBreaking the Chains of Injustice
Jury Nullification and the Fugitive Slave ActJury Nullification and Prohibition’s Legal RebellionJury Nullification in the Vietnam War EraJury Nullification in Marijuana CasesThe Laura Kriho Contempt CaseAll-White Juries and Civil Rights-Era AcquittalsThe Verdict Hear 'Round the World
Jury Nullification in the O.J. Simpson Trial